INTRODUCTION
In Klamath Strategic Investment Fund v. United States, 1 two law partners, Cary Patterson and Harold Nix, each made thirty million dollars between 1998 and 2000 by representing the State of Texas in its litigation against the tobacco industry. 2 To manage their sixty million dollars of wealth, Patterson and Nix sought investment vehicles through their longtime accounting firm, which in turn identified Presidio Advisory Services, an investment advisory firm involved in foreign currency trading. 3 Presidio designed a complex plan by which Patterson and Nix could create large artificial losses, which could then be used as tax deductions to offset their taxable income. 4 As a result of this transaction, the details of which will be discussed in Part I.B.3.a, Patterson and Nix each claimed over twenty-five million dollars in artificial tax deductions. 5 Tax shelters are defined by the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code) as any "entity, plan, or arrangement" that has the "significant purpose" of avoiding or evading federal income tax. 6 These transactions are not entered for a money-making business purpose, but solely as a means to reduce federal tax liability. 7 These tax shelters can be described as abusive in the sense that they depart from genuine economic objectives and fundamental tax principles to exploit a loophole in the tax law. 8 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) invalidated the tax deductions claimed by Patterson and Nix, concluding that the transaction giving rise to the tax deductions lacked real economic substance and was entered for the sole purpose of avoiding taxes. 9 As a result, Patterson and Nix owed higher taxes. 10 Furthermore, the IRS assessed accuracy-related penalties for their substantial understatement of tax liability, at twenty percent of the claimed tax deduction amount, based on Internal Revenue Code section 6662. 11 Patterson and Nix argued before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas that, inter alia, the accuracy-related tax penalties should not apply because they had reasonable cause for their tax treatment. 12 The court's analysis of the accuracy-related penalties assessed against Patterson and Nix is detailed in Part I.B.3.a. For now, consider whether Patterson and Nix should be given the opportunity to assert a reasonable cause exception to the penalties in light of the following facts: (1) Patterson and Nix entered the transaction with genuine intent to invest in a seven-year foreign currency portfolio; 13 (2) Patterson and Nix did not know that Presidio Advisory Services designed the transaction to effect an early withdrawal before the end of the seven-year investment period; 14 and (3) Patterson and Nix were unaware of the tax benefit that would result from their withdrawal until after such withdrawal. 15 In light of these circumstances, should Patterson and Nix have been subjected, not only to a disallowance of the tax deduction claimed, but also to a penalty amounting to approximately ten million dollars collectively? 16 6. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (2006 This Note analyzes the conflict embodied in a legislative proposal considered under the 111th Congress that sought, among other things, to eliminate the reasonable cause exception to accuracy-related penalties assessed against transactions lacking economic substance (noneconomic substance transactions). The bill, America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, 17 or H.R. 3200, proposed to eliminate the reasonable cause exception, thereby making the penalty standard one of strict liability. 18 This Note evaluates the pros and cons of changing the penalty standard from reasonable cause to strict liability. This debate is important not only in the context of bills such as H.R. 3200, but as an outstanding issue about the proper standard by which to penalize tax shelters. Congress has considered legislative proposals regarding noneconomic substance transactions since 1999 when tax shelters began to attract public attention, and in every subsequent Congress thereafter, giving rise to the inference that the debate over the proper penalty standard will likely continue even if a particular bill under the current Congress does not pass into law. 19 Hence, this Note is anchored in the framework of H.R. 3200 but should be read in the larger context of policy concerns surrounding the proper standard by which to penalize noneconomic substance transactions. 20 19. See infra Part I.C.1. 20. This Note's treatment of H.R. 3200 relies in part on the analysis of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) on the President's Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposal, which is intended to contain provisions on the codification of the economic substance doctrine (ESD) and the penalty standard that are substantively identical to those in H.R. 3200. As the JCT acknowledges in its analysis, the President's proposal does not anchor itself to a particular bill in Congress; therefore the analysis proceeds with the assumption that it will encompass another bill that Congress eventually passes. H.R. 3200 was noted as one of the most recent bills proposing codification of the ESD. Thus, this Note uses the framework of H.R. 3200 on the premise that the underlying issues are likely to remain unchanged even if another bill with substantively identical provisions supersedes the version of H.R. 3200 discussed in this Note. Where the JCT borrows certain assumptions from similar 2007 proposals, this Note uses H.R. 3200 to the extent that the underlying analysis remains valid. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON lines, some of the arguments for or against the proposed penalty standard originated with legislative proposals preceding H.R. 3200, but are incorporated into the current debate to the extent that such arguments relate to provisions that are substantively identical under the current proposal and remain relevant to the considerations at issue today.
Part I of this Note defines the Economic Substance Doctrine (ESD) under common law, explains accuracy-related penalties that are assessed under the Code for noneconomic substance transactions, and traces legislative proposals to codify the ESD both in the past and at present. Part II discusses the conflict between the reasonable cause exception and the strict liability standard by examining arguments for and against the strict liability standard. Part III posits that on balance, the arguments weigh against adopting the strict liability standard, and regardless of whether the current penalty regime is retained or alternative solutions are developed, the reasonable cause exception should remain a feature of the standard by which to penalize noneconomic substance transactions.
I. THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE AND TAX PENALTIES: THE EXISTING JUDICIAL APPLICATION VERSUS THE PROPOSED STATUTORY STANDARD
Part I provides the background information necessary to understand the conflict over the proper tax penalty standard to use in noneconomic substance transactions. Part I.A defines the ESD by its judicial application in the circuit courts. Part I.B explains the accuracy-related tax penalties assessed for noneconomic substance transactions and the reasonable cause exception to that penalty. Part I.C summarizes legislative efforts to codify the ESD under the I.R.C., including the proposal to penalize noneconomic substance transactions using the strict liability standard.
A. Economic Substance Doctrine Under Common Law
Part I.A introduces the ESD in its present state. Part I.A.1 defines this common-law doctrine and its role in the tax shelter problem. Part I.A.2 recounts the various forms of the doctrine as used across the circuit courts and previews the implications of this circuit split on efforts to codify the doctrine.
The Tax Shelter Problem and the Role of the Economic Substance Doctrine
The I.R.C. is the body of law that establishes statutory tax rules to compute one's tax liability. 21 Where the taxpayer attempts to avoid taxes by engaging in transactions that comply with the literal requirements of the Code but have the effect of circumventing tax liability he would otherwise bear, courts can disallow the tax benefit claimed by the taxpayer. 22 This principle is termed "substance-over-form" for the idea that courts will look to the "transaction's substance rather than its form" in determining whether true economic substance exists to justify the tax deduction. 23 Stated differently, the legislative purpose behind the I.R.C. prohibits taxpayers from reaping tax benefits by entering into transactions lacking economic reality. 24 Tax shelter transactions differ from real economic transactions in essence. 25 Real economic transactions have the purpose of making a profit by increasing revenues or decreasing operating expenses and, hence, must generate a level of economic return that exceeds the cost of capital at risk of loss. 26 In contrast, tax shelter transactions have the sole and specific purpose of reducing the taxpayer's tax liability by generating losses or tax credits and, hence, are not necessarily expected to make a positive return on the cost and fees invested into the transaction. 27 The transactions are designed, however, to limit any losses to small predictable losses and avoid large unpredictable losses. 28 Essentially, tax shelters are not real business transactions but artificial transactions designed to exploit a loophole in the tax law. 29 According to a conservative estimate in 1999, tax shelter transactions cost the federal government approximately seven billion dollars in federal taxes. 30 Another estimate in 2003 places tax shelter costs at eighty-five billion dollars. 31 22. See Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("The economic substance doctrine represents a judicial effort to enforce the statutory purpose of the tax code. From its inception, the economic substance doctrine has been used to prevent taxpayers from subverting the legislative purpose of the tax code by engaging in transactions that are fictitious or lack economic reality simply to reap a tax benefit.").
23. See Freytag v Comm'r, 904 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that economic substance is required to claim a tax deduction, which is consistent with the I.R.C.'s premise that taxation is based on a "transaction's substance rather than its form"); Donald L. Korb Donald Korb, the former IRS Chief Counsel, has remarked that abusive tax shelters have been one of IRS's biggest problems in the last decade. 32 Similarly, the Obama Administration recently issued a press release recognizing the tax shelter problem, noting that eighty-three percent of the largest U.S. corporations have subsidiaries in tax havens, 33 or low-tax countries to which the corporation can transfer its revenue to avoid taxes. 34 Other commentators echo that the tax shelter problem is proliferating. 35 A judicial doctrine for dealing with tax shelter transactions is the ESD, 36 which analyzes whether a transaction has real economic substance beyond tax avoidance. 37 Gregory v. Helvering 38 is one of the first cases to apply the ESD and generally credited to be the case from which the doctrine developed. 39 In Gregory, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that taxpayers have a right to decrease or avoid taxes through legal means, which is distinguishable from engaging in transactions solely for tax benefits. 40 The Supreme Court disregarded intermediate transfers of stocks as transactions that had "no business or corporate purpose" and performed no function other than reducing taxes. 41 entered for nontax purposes that produced accompanying tax benefits, the latter of which should be honored. 43 The ESD involves two prongs that are used to determine whether a given transaction has economic substance: The first prong is objective-whether the transaction resulted in a meaningful change in the economic position of the taxpayer other than tax reduction (the economic benefit prong). 44 The second prong is subjective-whether the taxpayer's subjective intent in entering the transaction was merely tax reduction or some other nontax business purpose such as profit (business purpose prong). 45 The taxpayer who claims the tax deduction carries the burden of proving that the transaction has economic substance. 46 If a court determines that a transaction lacks economic substance, it may recharacterize the transaction to conform to the economic reality and invalidate the tax benefit purportedly arising from the transaction. 47 
Circuit Courts' Application of the Economic Substance Doctrine
This section discusses how the two-prong test is applied by the circuit courts. There is a split among the circuits as to whether this two-prong test should be used conjunctively or disjunctively, as well as to how each of the two prongs should be defined. 48 While this Note does not focus on the conflict of this split in authority, it is essential to understand the circuit split as context for the inception and development of the proposals to codify the ESD. Specifically, the circuit courts' inconsistent application of the ESD has been a prominent ground for attack by proponents of codification, who argue that the ESD should be codified into the I.R.C. to clarify the doctrine as one test for economic substance. 49 
a. Circuit Split in the Two-Prong Test
Case law demonstrates a lack of uniformity in the application of the twoprong test in the circuit courts. 50 In addition to the circuit split on whether the two prongs should be used conjunctively or disjunctively, each of the two prongs is defined by various factors. 55 For the objective economic benefit prong, at least two measures are used to define what constitutes a "meaningful change" in the taxpayer's economic position: One approach used by the Federal Circuit looks for economic benefit in fact obtained. 56 Another approach used by the Second Circuit looks for the potential for profit. 57 In courts using the profit potential approach, some courts look for profit that is more than nominal 58 51. This means that even if the taxpayer meets the subjective prong by possessing a profit motive, the tax benefit will be disallowed if the transaction objectively lacks economic substance. See, e.g., Klamath, 568 F.3d at 545 (requiring both the taxpayer's subjective profit motive and objective profit potential and disregarding the transaction because it lacked objective profit potential); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 20, at 36 n.84.
52. This means that before a transaction is deemed to lack economic substance, the court will require that the transaction lack both the objective and subjective prongs. See while other courts permit nominal profit potential to satisfy the objective prong of the two-prong test. 59 The subjective prong is also analyzed using various considerations. 60 Former IRS Chief Counsel Korb summarized at least seven types of evidence considered by courts when determining a taxpayer's subjective business purpose for entering the transaction. 61 Such evidence includes the taxpayer's capital commitment to the transaction and the nature of the relationship between the parties to the transaction. 62 Further, there is a split as to whether financial accounting benefit qualifies as subjective business purpose. 63 One scholar has suggested that all of these variations should be codified as one set of factors to be considered by a court in determining whether a transaction has economic substance. 64 An in-depth treatment of the courts' rationale for the various approaches is beyond the scope of this Note. 65 The relevant takeaway is the understanding that the circuit courts apply the ESD inconsistently, which has served as one of the primary arguments for codifying the ESD into the I.R.C. 66 Ultimately, the criticism is that the variations serve as means for the courts to invalidate transactions based on a type of "smell test," 67 he following evidence has been considered by the courts: (i) whether a profit was even possible; (ii) whether the taxpayer had a nontax business reason to engage in the transaction; (iii) whether the taxpayer, or its advisors, considered or investigated the transaction, including market risk; (iv) whether the taxpayer really committed capital to the transaction; (v) whether the entities involved in the transaction were entities separate and apart from the taxpayer and engaging in legitimate business before and after the transaction; (vi) whether all the purported steps were engaged in at arms-length with the parties doing what the parties intended to do; and (vii) whether the transaction was marketed as a tax shelter in which the purported tax benefit significantly exceeded the taxpayer's actual investment.").
62. , dissenting) ("I can't help but suspect that the majority's conclusion to the contrary is, in its essence, something akin to a 'smell test.' If the scheme in question smells bad, the intent to avoid taxes defines the result as we do not want the taxpayer to 'put one over.' . . . The fact that ACM may have 'put one over' in crafting these transactions ought not to influence our inquiry."); Rector, supra note 65, at 184 (suggesting that the circuit differences are not lends itself to subjectivity and inconsistent results. 68 Part I.C.1 further describes the reasons behind proposals to codify the ESD. Before returning to this issue, the next section of this Note explains that, once a court determines that a transaction lacks economic substance, the court can disallow the purported tax benefit and uphold IRS's assessment of penalties. 69 
B. Tax Penalties for Noneconomic Substance Transactions Under the Internal Revenue Code
After a court holds that a transaction lacks economic substance and that the claimed tax deduction should be disallowed, the next question is whether IRS's assessment of penalties was proper. Part I.B illustrates how these penalties operate. Part I.B.1 explains accuracy-related penalties, and Part I.B.2 explains a defense to these penalties, the reasonable cause exception. Part I.B.3 demonstrates how these pieces fit together by way of two cases with opposite outcomes.
Accuracy-Related Penalties Under I.R.C. Section 6662
Under the I.R.C., various tax penalties are assessed for a taxpayer's failure to comply with the requirements of the Code. 70 One such penalty is identified in section 6662 as "accuracy-related penalties," which are assessed for underpayments of federal income tax. 71 Accuracy-related penalties are assessed for underpayments arising from (1) the taxpayer's negligence, (2) a substantial understatement of the income tax, (3) a substantial valuation misstatement, (4) a substantial overstatement of pension liabilities, and (5) a substantial valuation understatement of estate or gift tax. 72 For any underpayment of income tax under section 6662(b), the penalty is generally twenty percent of the underpayment amount. 73 The second of the five scenarios above, the substantial understatement of income tax, is used by IRS and courts to penalize underpayments arising from the disallowance of tax benefits in noneconomic substance transactions. 74 An "understatement" is defined as the difference in amount determinative of the result but that courts are "informally deciding whether they 'like' a transaction" and then using their version of the test to justify the result). 3. There are cases in which IRS asserts that the disallowance of tax deductions in noneconomic substance transactions leads to a valuation misstatement of the correct tax liability and a taxpayer's reported tax liability. 75 An understatement is "substantial" if it is greater than ten percent or $5000 of the reported tax liability. 76 For corporations, that amount is the lesser of either (1) the amount that is greater between ten percent of the correct tax or $10,000 or (2) ten million dollars. 77 The Treasury Regulations establish rules for adjusting the amount of understatement in certain circumstances. 78 2. The Reasonable Cause Exception Under I.R.C. Section 6664 I.R.C. section 6664 establishes exceptions to accuracy-related penalties imposed by section 6662. 79 Section 6664(c) serves as a defense to the assertion of underpayment penalties arising under section 6662 if the taxpayer can demonstrate reasonable cause and good faith (reasonable cause or reasonable cause exception). 80 In noneconomic substance transactions, reasonable cause is demonstrated by a facts and circumstances test, wherein the most important factor is the extent to which the taxpayer attempted to assess the proper tax liability. 81 Where the taxpayer relies on a tax professional's opinion, such opinion must be based on all relevant laws and facts in the particular case, which requires full disclosure on the part of the taxpayer of all facts relevant to the proper tax treatment and the purpose for entering the transaction. 82 Stated another way, the taxpayer cannot reasonably rely on a tax professional's opinion unless it is based on complete knowledge of the tax law and all relevant facts that the taxpayer knew or should have known. 83 The penalty in addition to the understatement penalty. Circuit courts are split on this issue. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits hold that valuation misstatement does not apply in noneconomic substance transactions, while the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits permit valuation misstatement penalties based on the disallowance of tax deductions as a result of noneconomic substance transactions. This circuit split is beyond the scope of this Note. Because the penalty standard debate is not differentiated by which of the two grounds is used to assert the accuracy-related penalty, this Note will limit its discussion to substantial understatements of income tax. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON . The calculation of the understatement amount may be adjusted in two situations: when the portion of understatement that is attributable to the treatment of an item is supported by substantial authority or when relevant facts surrounding the tax treatment of an item are adequately disclosed and substantiated by a reasonable basis. Id. In the case of tax shelters, the calculation of understatement is adjusted by the portion attributable to substantial authority and reasonable belief, which is covered in Part I.B. In this section of the Note, two cases help illustrate the function of the accuracy-related penalty and reasonable cause exception in cases involving noneconomic substance transactions. The first is Klamath, the Fifth Circuit case introduced earlier in the Note, wherein the taxpayer established reasonable cause by relying on the advice of tax accountants and tax lawyers regarding a complex loan transaction. 85 The second case is Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 86 a Second Circuit case in which the taxpayer failed to establish reasonable cause because the tax lawyers' advice was received long after the tax return was filed, the lawyers' opinion was based on minimal legal analysis lacking relevant legal authority, and the taxpayer lacked good faith. 87 
a. Klamath Strategic Investment Fund v. United States
In Klamath, two law partners Patterson and Nix each claimed approximately twenty-five million dollars in tax deductions, which were disallowed because the transaction was deemed to lack economic substance by the IRS, whose decision was validated by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas and then affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. 88 The transaction at issue was designed by Presidio Advisory Services (Presidio), which created a complex plan by which Patterson and Nix would invest in foreign currencies over a seven-year period in three stages. 89 The investments would be made through newly created limited liability companies named Klamath and Kinabalu, which would be treated as partnerships for tax purposes. 90 These partnerships each borrowed $66.7 million from National Westminster Bank (Bank), with twenty-five million dollars of that amount being deemed a loan premium, which represented a high interest rate of 17.97% to be paid to the bank. 91 To protect the bank's ability to collect this interest, the credit agreement between the Bank and the partnerships included a prepayment provision, requiring that in the event of early repayment of the loan by the partnerships, the bank would be entitled to a prepayment amount of twenty-five million dollars, which would decrease over seven years. 92 However, within the first sixty days of the seven-year investment period, Patterson and Nix withdrew from the partnerships. 93 They received cash and Euros in liquidation. 94 They subsequently sold the Euros, the proceeds of which were offset with over twenty-five million dollars in tax deductions arising from Klamath and Kinabalu activities. 95 Patterson and Nix achieved this result by treating the twenty-five million dollar loan premium as if it was money they had contributed into the partnership and then calculating the Euros received in liquidation using that basis. 96 Then when they sold the Euros at a market value much less than this amount, large artificial losses were created. 97 This transaction was held to lack economic substance for three reasons, all tending to show that the transaction was not entered to achieve economic profit but merely to generate large losses that can be used as tax deductions. 98 First, the transaction was structured to cause the investors to withdraw from the investment within sixty to seventy days rather than its purported seven-year term. 99 Second, a substantial portion of the purported investment was never intended to occur because the credit agreement provided that the Bank would hold all of the funds in collateral, with power to force the investors to withdraw within sixty to seventy days. 100 Third, Presidio's service fees were a function of losses generated by the investment, rather than as a function of profits generated. 101 Therefore, the transaction lacked a reasonable expectation of generating a profit and failed the objective economic benefit prong of the test for economic substance. 102 Even though the court held that Patterson and Nix possessed the subjective intent to enter the transaction for a nontax purpose, this was not enough to uphold the transaction because the Fifth Circuit uses a conjunctive test, requiring both objective economic benefit and subjective business purpose to validate a transaction. 103 In addition to disallowing the tax deductions for this noneconomic substance transaction, the IRS also assessed accuracy-related penalties for 99. This was done by requiring that the investors maintain collateral with the Bank in an amount that exceeded the total value of the amount owed to the bank. The Bank had discretion to determine whether the collateral was satisfied, or to declare a default and force the investor to withdraw from the partnership. the partners' substantial understatement of tax liability. 104 Patterson and Nix argued against the penalties by asserting the reasonable cause defense. 105 The Fifth Circuit noted that the most important factor in establishing reasonable cause is the taxpayer's effort to assess the proper tax liability. 106 A professional tax advisor's opinion does not necessarily satisfy reasonable cause, but the court examines the validity of the taxpayer's reliance by looking to the quality and objectivity of the tax advisor's opinion. 107 Here, Patterson and Nix obtained legal advice from tax attorneys and accountants, who wrote detailed opinions based on reasonable interpretations of the tax law. 108 Patterson and Nix also provided all relevant facts to inform the tax opinion. 109 Therefore, the tax opinion was a sufficient basis upon which Patterson and Nix could rely. 110 Patterson and Nix relied on this opinion in good faith, being unaware of the understanding between Presidio and the Bank that the transaction was designed solely to generate tax losses. 111 As a result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Patterson and Nix carried their burden of demonstrating reasonable cause and held that Patterson and Nix were not subject to the understatement penalties. 112 
b. Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States
Long Term is a Second Circuit case involving a five-step transaction designed to create a tax deductible loss of $400 million. 113 The Second Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut's holding that the transaction lacked economic substance. 114 The transaction at issue in Long Term is complex and technical, but the salient facts are simplified as follows and involved the "creation and cloning of an artificial loss that was marketed at least twice and hidden on the tax return by 104 taxpayers whose business was unrelated to the origin of the loss." 115 The first step involved the creation of a foreign entity, Onslow Trading Company (Onslow), which was to receive lease income from preexisting leases of computer hardware and trucks in exchange for making a $400 million deposit to cover the exposure of the lease payments. 116 This step had the purpose of assigning $400 million in lease income to a foreign entity that would not be subject to U.S. income taxes. 117 Step two was the creation of a controlled subsidiary to which Onslow contributed its $400 million of lease deposits and exposure obligations. 118 In exchange, Onslow received four million dollars of the subsidiary's preferred stock. 119 The subsidiary was essentially purchasing Onslow's $400 million in exposure obligations as a deductible loss. 120 In step three, Onslow sold its subsidiary preferred stock to Long Term Capital Portfolio. 121 Long Term Capital Portfolio was traceable to individual principals who formed Long Term Capital Management, which had a partnership interest in Long Term Capital Partners, which in turn had a partnership interest in Long Term Capital Portfolio (collectively Long Term). 122 This had the effect of giving Long Term four million dollars in the subsidiary's preferred stock, which had a tax deductible base of $400 million that had stayed with the subsidiary. 123 In step four, Long Term secured a fifty million dollar investment from investors through the bank UBS. 124 In step five, Long Term sold some of the preferred stock it had purchased from Onslow for one million dollars, which had a book value of $107 million, resulting in an artificial loss of $106 million that was allocated to the principal-partners of Long Term Capital Management. 125 The IRS disallowed the $106 million in deductions claimed by the partners of Long Term Capital Management, and then assessed accuracyrelated penalties for their understatement of taxes. 126 The district court agreed with IRS's conclusion that the transaction lacked economic substance and validated the assessment of penalties. 127 128. See Warren, supra note 114, at 692. Long Term also asserted the defense that its tax treatment was supported by substantial authority and reasonable belief, which would mean either that there was no understatement of tax liability or that its understatement amount
In analyzing Long Term's reasonable cause defense, the court noted that whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause requires a case by case analysis, considering all pertinent facts and circumstances. 129 Like the court in Klamath, the district court noted that the most important factor in determining whether the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and good faith is the extent to which the taxpayer attempted to assess the proper tax liability. 130 Then, the court made an important distinction with regard to reliance on professional tax advice-reliance on professional tax advice alone does not establish reasonable cause and good faith but, rather, such reliance must be reasonable in light of all of the circumstances. 131 Reasonability requires two elements: First, the professional tax advice must be based upon all pertinent facts and circumstances as well as laws relating to those facts, which requires that the taxpayer fully disclose all facts relevant to the proper tax treatment as well as the purpose for entering into the transaction. 132 Second, the advice cannot be based on unreasonable factual and legal assumptions, including inaccurate assumptions about the taxpayer's purpose for entering into the transaction or for structuring it in a particular manner. 133 The district court then held that Long Term failed to establish reasonable cause and good faith for several reasons. 134 First, the legal tax opinion upon which Long Term claims to have relied was not received by Long Term until after Long Term filed its tax return. 135 Second, even if the legal opinion had been received in a timely manner, Long Term could not demonstrate that the legal opinion was based on all pertinent facts or that such opinion did not rely on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions. 136 The district court described the legal opinion as containing minimal legal analysis and only a brief discussion of basic facts, which amounted to "superficial pronouncements asking the Court to 'trust us.'" 137 Additionally, even if the legal opinion was substantively sufficient, the partners of Long Term Capital Management did not review it. 138 Lastly, Long Term failed to act in good faith by attempting to conceal the tax losses by reporting them under the line item "Net Unrealized Gains" and would be reduced by the portion attributable to substantial authority and reasonable belief. See id. Substantial authority is an objective analysis of the law, which looks to whether the taxpayer had substantial legal authority supporting his tax treatment and, if so, reduces the understatement amount by the portion attributable to that substantial authority. Here, the district court held that Long Term lacked substantial authority because it could not demonstrate any authority that recognizes tax deductible losses arising from noneconomic substance transactions. This section addresses the numerous legislative attempts to codify the ESD into the I.R.C., beginning in 1999. Three main reasons were purported to be the goals behind codification: (1) deter aggressive noneconomic substance transactions, (2) clarify the ESD by codifying one definition of the doctrine, and (3) raise federal revenue by assessing tax penalties for noneconomic substance transactions. This section elaborates on these reasons and gives examples of prior legislation between 1999 and 2007, which sought to achieve these aims.
a. Deter Noneconomic Substance Transactions and Tax Avoidance
As an initial policy matter, noneconomic substance transactions are seen as hurtful to the economy and to be dealt with in a manner that deters such transactions. 142 Proponents argue that the strong need for deterrence justifies codification of the ESD. 143 The codified ESD is argued to be a more effective deterrent than the common-law doctrine, as demonstrated by other targeted legislation that drove behavior and deterred misconduct. 144 The proposals throughout the years, discussed in greater detail in later sections of this Note, have had the overarching purpose of bolstering the federal government's ability to combat tax shelters. 145 
b. Codify One Definition of the Test for Economic Substance
Another goal of the codification effort is to define one uniform application of the doctrine. 146 As demonstrated in Part I.A.2, the circuit courts are split on whether the two prongs of the ESD should be used conjunctively or disjunctively. 147 In addition, each of the two prongs is defined using various factors. 148 This lack of uniformity is a prominent reason behind legislative efforts to codify one definition of what constitutes a noneconomic substance transaction. 149 In 1999, the Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation first discussed the possibility of codifying the ESD as one approach to combat tax shelters. 150 The ESD would be codified as a one-prong test using the objective economic benefit prong. 151 The 2004 JOBS Act acknowledged that circuit courts were applying the ESD inconsistently 155 and proposed to define the ESD as a two-prong conjunctive test. 156 Specifically, a transaction would have economic substance if it changes the taxpayer's economic position in a meaningful way, and the taxpayer has a substantial nontax purpose for entering into the transaction with a reasonable means of accomplishing such purpose. 157 The court would retain the discretion to determine if the ESD was relevant in a given case. 158 The JOBS Act passed into law on October 22, 2004, 159 but excluded the portions of the bill regarding the codification of the ESD and the accompanying penalty provision. 160 In 2005 during the 109th Congress, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) proposed its version of a codification proposal, noting that the lack of clarity produces unfairness, which is compounded by the high tax penalty. 161 The JCT's 2005 proposal differed from the JOBS Act of 2004 in three key aspects. First, the subjective prong would require that the business purpose of the transaction be substantial and "bear a reasonable relationship to the taxpayer's normal business operations or investment activities." 162 This change was premised on the idea that a transaction that bears no relationship to the taxpayer's normal business activities may signal that it was entered into merely for tax purposes. 163 Second, courts would be able to invalidate an entire transaction that consists of portions seeking nontax purposes as well as portions seeking only tax avoidance. 164 Third, the ESD would be used by courts only for certain "applicable transactions," defining six such categories and giving the Treasury authority to add or 155. See id. § VIII(C)(1). 156. See id. § VIII(C)(2). 157. See id. § VIII(C)(3). There is criticism that this proposal purported to define the ESD in a manner inconsistent with common-law precedent. First, the objective economic benefit prong under the proposal would use a "change in economic position" test, which would be broader than the "reasonable expectation for profit" test applied by the courts. Second, the subjective business purpose prong under the proposal would require, on top of a nontax purpose, a reasonable means to achieve it, and, hence, would be more restrictive than the common-law standard. See id. § VIII(C)(3)-(4) & nn.1242-45.
158. See id. § VIII(C)(2) (noting that the proposed standard would apply only upon a court's determination that the ESD is relevant in a case, without which the legislation would have no effect 167 This Senate proposal would also define the ESD using a two-prong conjunctive test, requiring the transaction to change the taxpayer's economic position in a meaningful way apart from federal income tax benefits and to have a substantial nontax purpose. 168 The 2007 proposal differed from prior proposals in that it excluded from the subjective prong the requirement of either a reasonable means of accomplishing the nontax purpose, as in the 2004 JOBS Act, or a reasonable relationship to the taxpayer's normal business activities, as in the 2005 proposal. 169 Like prior bills, Congress did not adopt the 2007 proposal. 170 
c. Raise Federal Revenue Through Tax Penalties
Legislative proposals to codify the ESD began to include a penalty provision with the JOBS Act of 2004, which provided that tax penalties would be assessed for noneconomic substance transactions as an explicit category subject to accuracy-related penalties under the I.R.C. 171 Penalties assessed for noneconomic substance transactions act as revenue offsets against federal spending. 172 The assessment of this penalty as a revenue raiser for the federal government has been noted by some as one of the driving forces behind the codification effort. 173 165. See Keinan, supra note 145, § VIII(D)(6). The six categories of applicable transactions were the following: (1) "offsetting positions," or transactions by which the taxpayer can recognize a loss without recognizing an offsetting gain in the same period; (2) transactions that create or increase a loss or reduce a gain by way of a disparity between basis and fair market value; (3) transactions that create or increase a gain in an asset, which do not result in a recognizable loss if the asset is sold at fair market value; (4) transactions with tax-indifferent parties; (5) transactions in which the taxpayer disposes of property in less than a forty-five day holding period; and (6) transactions in which certain deductions are permitted for federal tax purposes but not for financial accounting purposes. See id. The JOBS Act proposed that a penalty be assessed at forty percent of the understatement amount resulting from the disallowance of a tax deduction, which would be reduced to twenty percent with adequate disclosure of all relevant facts surrounding the transaction. 174 These penalties, along with the purported heightened deterrent effect of the codified ESD, were estimated to generate over thirteen billion dollars in federal revenue over a ten-year period between 2004 and 2013. 175 The penalty provision in the JOBS Act was excluded from the version of the bill signed into law on October 22, 2004. 176 The 2005 proposals were substantially similar to the 2004 JOBS Act except that they proposed a major change to administer the penalty on a strict liability basis. 177 The strict liability standard, which is discussed further in Part I.C.2.b, meant that the taxpayer's reliance on the advice of a tax professional could not serve as a defense to the penalty. 178 One of the 2005 proposals, S. 2020, was estimated to generate fifteen billion dollars from codifying the ESD. 179 In the 2007 proposal, 180 the penalty was adjusted to thirty percent, which would be reduced to twenty percent if the taxpayer adequately disclosed the facts surrounding the transaction. 181 Like the 2005 proposals, the 2007 proposal would administer the penalty on a strict liability basis, precluding the taxpayer from asserting a defense to the penalty based on outside tax opinions or in-house analyses tending to demonstrate reasonable cause. 182 Estimates of the revenue to be generated by the several 2007 proposals, including S. 2242, ranged between $3.5 billion and $10 billion. 183 174. See Keinan, supra note 145, § VIII(C)(7 185 The former section defined how the ESD should be codified, and the latter section specified how the penalty provision should be incorporated into the I.R.C. 186 
See id. § VIII(A) (noting that Congress has not adopted any of the proposals to date

a. Section 452: Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine
H.R. 3200 proposed to codify ESD into the I.R.C. as an amendment to section 7701, which covers procedural and administrative definitions under the I.R.C. 187 The ESD would be codified as a two-prong conjunctive test, requiring that (1) the transaction change the taxpayer's economic position in a meaningful way apart from reducing federal tax and that (2) the taxpayer have a substantial nontax business purpose for entering into the transaction. 188 The nontax business purpose prong is not satisfied by the taxpayer's purpose to achieve a financial accounting benefit if such financial accounting benefit is intended to achieve a reduction of tax. 189 The proposal included a "special rule where taxpayer relies on profit potential," which stated that a profit potential must have a "present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit [that is] substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits" arising from the transaction. 190 Courts would retain the discretion to determine when the ESD applies in a particular case. 191 In addition, the proposal stated that other common-law doctrines would not be affected by the proposal. 192 Lastly, the Treasury Department would have authority to publish regulations to carry out the purpose of the proposal. 
b. Section 453: Penalties for Underpayments
H.R. 3200 section 453 was the penalty provision, which was an important component of the proposal and fit into the goal of deterring tax shelters. 194 The penalty provision proposed to enact three important amendments to existing accuracy-related penalties and the reasonable cause exception, to be discussed below. 195 The penalty provision was estimated to raise $3.6 billion of federal revenue over a ten-year period between 2010 and 2019. 196 The first provision in section 453 was to amend I.R.C. section 6662(b) to add noneconomic substance transactions as a sixth category of underpayments giving rise to a penalty. 197 A twenty percent penalty would be imposed, calculated as a percent of the understatement amount resulting from the disallowance of the claimed tax deduction. 198 The second provision of section 453 proposed a heighted penalty of forty percent where a taxpayer failed to adequately disclose all relevant facts surrounding the tax treatment of an item at issue. 199 The third change proposed by H.R. 3200 is the source of the conflict addressed in this Note. The proposal would amend section 6664, which currently provides that no penalty shall apply to underpayments for which reasonable cause and good faith can be shown on the part of the taxpayer. 200 Under the proposal, the reasonable cause exception would be inapplicable to noneconomic substance transactions, 201 which means that as long as the transaction is deemed to lack economic substance, the section 6662 understatement penalty would apply, and the taxpayer would be precluded from asserting the reasonable cause exception as a defense to the penalty. 202 Hence, the taxpayer has no opportunity to demonstrate that his tax position is substantiated by professional tax opinions or in-house analyses. 203 The penalty cannot be abated unless the underlying understatement amount is recalculated under a different set of rules. 204 Stated another way, the penalty can only be abated in proportion to an abatement of the underlying tax liability. 205 The changes proposed by section 453 would effectively make the penalty standard one of strict liability. 206 In summary, H.R. 3200's penalty provision would have imposed a twenty percent penalty for underpayment of income tax that results from the disallowance of a tax benefit claimed by a taxpayer in a noneconomic substance transaction. 207 Should the taxpayer fail to disclose all relevant facts surrounding the tax treatment of an item in the transaction, he is subject to a forty percent penalty of the underpayment. 208 The taxpayer would no longer have the opportunity to avoid the penalty by asserting the reasonable cause exception but would be penalized under the strict liability standard. 209 This last provision, which proposed to change the penalty standard from reasonable cause to strict liability, is the focus of the debate in Part II, where this Note explores the question of whether the strict liability penalty standard is appropriate for application with the ESD.
II. THE DEBATE REGARDING THE TAX PENALTY STANDARD: ARGUMENTS
FOR AND AGAINST STRICT LIABILITY Part II examines arguments for and against the use of strict liability to assess penalties for noneconomic substance transactions. The debate regarding the strict liability penalty takes place within the larger context of the debate around codification of the ESD generally, in which the arguments for and against codification necessarily implicate the propriety of the penalty provisions contained therein. 210 Part II.A examines the arguments in favor of strict liability as espoused by its proponents. Part II.B examines arguments against strict liability as espoused by its opponents.
A. Proponents' Arguments in Favor of the Strict Liability Penalty Standard
This section of the Note considers arguments proffered by those who favor the strict liability standard. Proponents of strict liability argue that strict liability should be adopted in order to (1) better deter noneconomic substance transactions, (2) raise revenue for the federal government through the assessment of penalties, and (3) curtail the promotion of these tax evasion tools by tax professionals. 
Strict Liability Is a Stronger Deterrent to Noneconomic Substance Transactions Relative to Existing Law
The proposed penalty standard imposes a strict liability penalty for noneconomic substance transactions. 211 There is argument that a higher and stricter penalty is needed to better deter noneconomic substance transactions, 212 based on the observation that the current tax penalty regime does not sufficiently deter aggressive tax shelter transactions. 213 A taxpayer can gamble, in a sense, on a tax shelter transaction with the upside of obtaining the tax benefit and the downside of losing the tax benefit he attempted to realize. 214 This leaves him in a position that is no worse than the one he would be in without the tax shelter transaction. 215 Similarly, current IRS guidelines for settling tax shelter cases are said to be ineffective at deterring tax shelters because the taxpayer does not stand to be sufficiently disadvantaged from a finding that the transaction lacked economic substance. 216 These observations lead the proponents of strict liability to argue that the reasonable cause exception leaves too much "wiggle room" for the sophisticated taxpayer and too many opportunities to convince IRS or a court to validate a purely tax-motivated transaction. 217 Thus, the proponents advocate a strict liability standard, which alters the cost-benefit analysis of these taxpayers and increases the stakes should their transactions be deemed to lack economic substance. 218 226. See id. at 101-03 (statement of J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration) (arguing that complex tax laws permit taxpayers to exploit "angles" such as tax shelters but simultaneously require greater IRS resources to fight such abusive behavior).
227. See Warren, supra note 114, at 695 (stating that tax professionals have marketed tax shelter transactions as tax products, and such behavior will only change if courts uphold Akin to the argument that the current penalty regime is insufficient to deter noneconomic substance transactions, a similar argument is that tax professionals have become promoters of these noneconomic substance transactions and that this problem should be curtailed by penalizing the taxpayer on a strict liability basis. 228 The strict liability penalty for taxpayers would work in conjunction with penalties assessed on tax professionals for failing to comply with requirements of disclosure and confidence levels in issuing tax opinions that serve as substantial bases for taxpayers' tax positions. 229 
B. Opponents' Arguments Against the Strict Liability Penalty Standard
Opponents of strict liability argue that the strict liability penalty standard is not appropriate for noneconomic substance transactions. 230 At least one commentator has suggested that the strict liability penalty is the most flawed aspect of the proposed codification of ESD. 231 Strict liability penalties are rarely used in federal tax law. 232 In fact, it is reported that of the $29.5 billion in tax penalties assessed by the IRS in 2007, 37.6% were abated in whole or in part, illustrating the significant role of IRS's ability to abate tax penalties. 233 Opponents of the proposed strict liability standard espouse four main arguments: (1) strict liability contravenes broader tax penalty policies and is unfair to the taxpayer, (2) strict liability penalties should not be imposed as revenue raisers, (3) strict liability should not be used with a fluid and complex doctrine such as the ESD, and (4) strict liability may produce unintended consequences.
Strict Liability Contravenes Broader Tax Penalty Policies and Is Unfair to the Taxpayer
A basic premise of the I.R.C. is to encourage taxpayers' voluntary compliance to the Code. 234 That premise was enacted through the Improved Penalty and Compliance Tax Act (IMPACT) twenty years ago, which established that civil tax penalties should encourage taxpayers to voluntarily comply with the Code. 235 IMPACT was heavily influenced by recommendations from the IRS Task Force, which was composed of members of the IRS and Treasury Department who conducted an in-depth study in collaboration with government officials, taxpayers, private practitioners, and professional organizations to examine civil tax penalties. 236 The IRS Task Force concluded that four factors are crucial to encourage compliance to the Code: fairness, understandability, effectiveness, and ease of administration. 237 Similarly, the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) 2009 report to the Senate Finance Committee maintained that fairness and voluntary compliance are essential to the administration of the I.R.C., based on its extensive study involving review of key IRS policy documents and academic studies, interviews with four IRS divisions and representatives of twenty-five states, and collaboration with the Federation of Tax Administrators, IRS Office of Tax Shelter Analysis, the Treasury Department, and others. 238 The above studies established that tax penalties should be administered in a fair and equitable manner, which means penalties should distinguish taxpayers who commit culpable conduct from those who in good faith attempt to comply with the Code. 239 In order to be fair, penalty rules should be flexible to differentiate factual circumstances in each case and should distinguish willful from negligent misconduct. 240 237. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 222, at 7. These four principles mean that tax penalties should be easily understood, avoid assessing multiple penalties for the same misconduct, and treat all taxpayers in a fair and equitable manner. See AICPA, supra note 230, at 3.
238. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 233, at 1-3. The ABA Tax Section also believes that the guiding principles have not changed in the last twenty years. definition imposes the penalty regardless of whether the taxpayer substantially complied with the Code or made a good-faith attempt to do so. 241 Hence, opponents of the strict liability standard argue that strict liability is unfair to the taxpayer, particularly given the higher penalty of forty percent, and would discourage voluntary compliance as well as violate the basic tenets of the Code. 242 Particularly with regard to noneconomic substance transactions, the argument is that strict liability is not appropriate because it precludes the ability of courts to analyze the facts and circumstances of each case. 243 In its 2008 report to Congress, the National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) observed the lack of fairness in penalties that are imposed without determining whether the taxpayer's conduct warrants a penalty or whether the penalty is proportional to the misconduct. 244 The Tax Section of the American Bar Association (ABA) shares the NTA's concern regarding penalties that are imposed without giving the taxpayer the opportunity to demonstrate that penalties should not be imposed in his case. 245 Hence, the ABA Tax Section recommends that all tax penalties should include a reasonable cause and good-faith defense. 246 Similarly, NTA advocates that reasonable cause exceptions should take priority over harsh penalties. 247 Along the same lines, the IRS Policy Statement vows to provide the taxpayer a "reasonable opportunity to provide evidence that the penalty should not apply" and to fully consider any evidence that excuses the penalty even if the IRS initially intended to impose the penalty. 248 Tax Section on Civil Tax Penalty Reform, supra note 229, at 4 (recommending that "[i]nadvertent or excusable error should not be punished to the same degree (if at all) as willful misconduct"). . The ABA Tax Section would recommend that instead of adopting a strict liability penalty, IRS resources should be increased to allow the IRS to enforce its existing tools and penalties to combat tax shelters. See id. The ABA Tax Section is supportive of penalty regimes that are based on disclosure, rather than penalty regimes based on punishment and increased complexity. See id. at 4, 7-10.
244. See id. at 8 (citing TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 222, at 7-9). The National Taxpayer Advocate report cites studies, including the IRS Task Force Reports, that identify three components of perceived fairness in tax penalties: horizontal fairness, proportionality, and procedural fairness. Horizontal equity requires that tax penalties be administered in a manner that treats similarly situated taxpayers similarly, rather than applying the same penalty to everyone regardless of a given taxpayer's effort to comply with the tax code. To treat similarly situated taxpayers similarly, the IRS should inquire into the taxpayer's level of sophistication, prior compliance history, and other factual circumstances. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 222, at 7-9. The criticism is that under the strict liability penalty standard, a taxpayer would have no such opportunity to provide evidence to show that the penalty should not be imposed. 249 The taxpayer gets no opportunity for procedural due process prior to the assessment of penalties, 250 which is said to preclude a fair application of penalties. 251 In addition, there is no substantive due process because the proposed penalty does not define the proper standard by which to administer the penalty. 252 After the penalty is assessed, the taxpayer retains no meaningful opportunity for postassessment relief 253 because, while the IRS Commissioner may abate the penalty in certain circumstances, such circumstances are not defined and the Commissioner's decision is not subject to judicial review. 254 Hence, taxpayers with genuine mitigating circumstances would have no opportunity to challenge the assessment of a penalty against him at any stage of the penalty process. 255 The ABA Tax Section has recommended that the taxpayer be given the opportunity to challenge noneconomic substance transaction penalties both at the IRS Office of Appeals level and in the courts. 256 
Strict Liability Penalties Should Not Be Imposed as Revenue Raisers
There is opposition to the use of penalties as revenue raisers for the federal government. 257 Specifically, the penalty provisions contained in the codification proposals are seen as attempting to raise revenue by imposing high penalties designed to offset costs of other tax changes. 258 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) voiced its concern about the recent trend of tax penalties being assessed as revenue raisers. 259 The AICPA also noted that the 2004 IRS Penalty Policy Statement 260 shifted away from focusing on voluntary compliance in the 1980s toward a preference for assessing penalties. 261 The GAO also inferred that penalties are assessed on a cost-benefit basis from the trend that certain small penalties are not assessed because the cost of developing and asserting the penalty outweighs the penalty collected. 262 The 2008 NTA report and the ABA Tax Section recommend that penalties should aim to drive taxpayer behavior rather than to raise government revenues. 263 The NTA report concluded that strict liability does not comport with this objective because strict liability precludes IRS's ability to reward taxpayers' good-faith attempts to comply with the Code with an abatement of the penalty. 264 As a corollary, there is the additional argument that strict liability penalties encourage the IRS to aggressively assess penalties because the taxpayer has no opportunity to defend his tax position through the use of a reasonable cause exception. 265 Hence, the use of strict liability penalties to raise revenue is seen as unfair to the taxpayer and detrimental to the tax policy of encouraging voluntary compliance with the Code. Opponents of the strict liability standard note that the ESD is a doctrine that remains complex and unclear under the proposal and that it is, therefore, unsuitable for use with strict liability. 267 Because it is administered as a bright-line rule, strict liability is seen as useful and appropriate only in areas of the law where the rules are simple and clear. 268 The New York State Bar Association, despite supporting strict liability penalties for tax-shelter-related understatements, opposed the use of strict liability in the ESD, noting that the proposal leaves so much uncertainty that using a strict liability standard in this context would be unfair to the taxpayer. 269 ESD does not resolve the points of ambiguity in the doctrine and, therefore, should not be used with strict liability. 270 The ESD has been characterized as an inherently subjective analysis involving a case by case review of the facts and circumstances. 271 According to the JCT, the codified ESD does not become a more objective analysis but remains an inherently subjective test. 272 The JCT notes a number of cases in which the lower and appeals courts have reached opposite outcomes on the same facts, 273 or different jurisdictions have reached varying outcomes on cases with similar facts. 274 The proposal does not address whether existing case law should be reversed on any particular point. 275 In addition, the codified ESD provides that a court will use its discretion to decide if the ESD is even relevant to a given case, but does not specify the circumstances under which the court should apply the ESD. 276 Opponents of strict liability also point out that the proposed statutory language leaves many crucial elements undefined. 277 For example, in order for a transaction to be valid under the proposal, the transaction must change the taxpayer's economic position in a "meaningful way," and the taxpayer must have a "substantial purpose" for entering into the transaction. 278 Yet, what constitutes a "meaningful" change or a "substantial purpose" is not defined in the proposal. 279 Similarly, where a taxpayer relies on profit potential to justify the transaction, the proposal requires a "substantial" amount of pretax profit potential relative to the net tax benefit. 280 281 These terms have been used in different ways by different courts. 282 One commentator characterized the codification as "replacing judicial uncertainty with statutory uncertainty." 283 The argument is that a taxpayer's good-faith effort to calculate the correct tax liability should be considered in the assessment of penalties for noneconomic substance transactions. 284 If instead taxpayers are penalized as a result of inconsistent rulings, the legitimacy of the tax system could potentially be undermined. 285 
Strict Liability May Produce Unintended Consequences
Opponents of the strict liability standard predict unintended consequences from the codification of the ESD and the accompanying strict liability penalty. 286 The Senate Report to the predecessor of H.R. 3200 287 admittedly recognized that a strictly rule-based system, which cannot provide for every conceivable transaction, is not able to prevent all unintended consequences. 288 Opponents note at least two unintended consequences, one being increased litigation accompanied by decreased taxpayer cooperation and disclosure, and the other being the possibility that courts may hesitate to use the ESD. 289 Opponents expect increased litigation by taxpayers, especially with the higher penalty. 290 Former IRS Chief Counsel Korb characterizes the codified ESD as the "seeds of the next tax shelter problem," which would make litigation more complex and eliminate taxpayers' incentive to cooperate with the IRS because cooperation will not mitigate the penalty. 291 Opponents argue that IRS resources would be deflected to fight litigation or clarify the doctrine's application, based on evidence suggesting that defending on the ESD requires greater IRS resources than defending on other grounds. 292 There is even a question as to whether IRS agents will be disinclined to assert penalties under the ESD because of the doctrine's resource intensive nature. 293 Another unintended consequence predicted by opponents of the strict liability standard is that courts may hesitate to use the doctrine to invalidate a tax benefit or recharacterize a transaction because the penalties are higher and cannot be abated. 294 The strict liability penalty creates an anomaly by imposing a high penalty for noneconomic substance transactions, whereas the failure of the same transaction on other tax shelter doctrines would impose no or smaller penalties. 295 This is especially salient because the proposal does not define how the ESD will interact with other similar doctrines such as the "sham transaction" doctrine. 296 Hence, the ABA suggests that IRS should focus on pursuing cases on technical rules rather than on the ESD. 297 In conclusion, opponents of the strict liability standard argue that strict liability should not be used in the context of the ESD because it contravenes tax policies such as fairness to the taxpayer, is not proper as a revenue raiser, is unsuitable for use with a fluid and complex doctrine such as the ESD, and may produce unintended consequences. 298 Addressing the proponents' deterrence argument, opponents argue that the new penalty regime will not produce additional deterrence of tax shelters 299 300 At the same time, the higher penalty is believed to restrain legitimate transactions or tax planning because of the risk that the penalty will be improperly imposed on these legitimate activities, without the opportunity for abatement. 301 Ultimately, opponents of strict liability see it as a deviation from the traditional reasonable cause exception, the reasons for which are not sufficiently justified. 302 III. REJECTING THE STRICT LIABILITY PENALTY STANDARD: RETAIN THE CURRENT PENALTY REGIME OR DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS CONTAINING THE REASONABLE CAUSE EXCEPTION Part II explored the reasons for and against adopting a strict liability standard for penalizing noneconomic substance transactions. Part III.A argues against the adoption of the strict liability standard. Part III.B advocates that the current penalty regime containing the reasonable cause exception should be retained, or, alternatively, new solutions should be developed to address the tax shelter problem.
A. The Arguments Weigh Against Adopting the Strict Liability Penalty Standard
Admittedly, tax shelters are against public policy, and the ESD and its associated understatement penalty contribute to IRS's overall strategy in eradicating tax shelters. 303 The argument that harsh penalties are justified in tax shelters is a compelling one. 304 Notwithstanding the validity of the concern regarding tax shelters, the penalty regime can maintain its efficacy without changing the penalty standard from reasonable cause to strict liability. On balance of the arguments espoused by proponents and opponents of strict liability, the arguments weigh against adopting the strict liability standard.
The strongest argument for adopting the strict liability standard is deterrence of tax shelters. 305 While the proponents of strict liability criticize the current regime as failing to impose sufficient punitive shelters and (2) courts may hesitate to use the ESD because of the harsh strict liability penalty).
300. consequences relative to the potential benefit of noneconomic substance transactions, they do not clearly establish how strict liability will produce additional deterrence simply by making noneconomic substance transactions more onerous. 306 If the current understatement penalty of twenty percent is insufficient to deter tax shelters, it does not necessarily follow that a forty percent penalty will effectively deter tax shelters, even if the taxpayer is precluded from asserting the reasonable cause defense, as the taxpayer may still hedge his bets of winning on the claim that his transaction has economic substance. 307 This premise is augmented when considering the criticism that the codified ESD will remain an uncertain doctrine that may be applied by courts in an inconsistent manner. 308 As critics of strict liability point out, the strict liability penalty may be counterproductive to deterrence and instead drive taxpayers to resist disclosure to, and cooperation with, IRS because such disclosure or cooperation will not afford them any abatement of penalty. 309 The other arguments espoused by proponents of strict liability appear unrelated to the merits of the strict liability standard. First, the argument that strict liability penalties should be used to raise federal revenue appears to bear little connection to the merits of adopting a new standard by which to assess understatement penalties. Tax penalties as revenue raisers at best involve mixed motives and at worst become arbitrary punishment of the taxpayer, which is not within the role of tax penalties. 310 Notwithstanding the need to close the tax gap, which owes its existence largely to understatement of tax liability, 311 adopting a rule that unilaterally penalizes the taxpayer without regard to his good-faith attempt to report the correct tax liability can hardly be an ideal way to close the tax gap. Second, the argument that tax professionals must be deterred from promoting tax shelters appears misplaced because tax professionals should be, and are, regulated under standards of professional responsibility rather than through understatement tax penalties. 312 Penalizing the taxpayer for his tax advisor's misconduct amounts to unwarranted punishment of the taxpayer, who should be able to rely on the advice of his tax professional.
The strongest argument proffered by opponents of strict liability is the unfairness brought upon the taxpayer. 313 In eliminating the taxpayer's opportunity to justify his tax position before IRS or the court, at least two important interests are at stake. First, it undermines voluntary compliance by precluding the taxpayer from demonstrating his good-faith compliance with the Code, thereby reducing his incentive to voluntarily comply with 306 315 Should voluntary compliance be compromised, IRS would need to disperse its resources across a wider range of noncompliance rather than focusing its efforts on its most pressing needs. 316 This result is the opposite of what is needed to fight tax shelters, as evidence suggests that using the ESD to litigate tax shelter cases requires extensive resources. 317 One suggested remedy to the tax shelter problem called for IRS to increase its resources in order to fully implement the existing tools at IRS's disposal. 318 Decreasing voluntary compliance could ultimately debilitate IRS's efforts to combat tax shelters.
The second interest at stake in eliminating the reasonable cause exception is the due process that is denied to the taxpayer. 319 A taxpayer with genuine mitigating circumstances has no venue, either at the IRS level or at the federal court level, upon which to challenge the validity of the penalty assessed against him. 320 Such lack of due process does not advance any interest claimed by proponents of the strict liability standard, despite their efforts to characterize the reasonable cause exception as "wiggle room" to slither out of a penalty. 321 Rather, the taxpayer's inability to appeal the penalty is highly problematic, especially considering that the ESD is a fluid and uncertain doctrine that is unsuitable for statutory definition. 322 Not only is the split among the circuit courts unsettled, the codified ESD does not achieve a satisfactory resolution because it does not reconcile itself to existing case law and leaves many critical elements of the doctrine undefined. 323 A vague doctrine cannot serve as the basis for a bright-line strict liability penalty, but that is the curious result that would be reached by the codification proposal. 324 This context increases the need to permit the taxpayer to raise the reasonable cause exception, which may serve as a backstop in the event that inconsistent holdings result from the confusing legislation.
Balancing the arguments on either side of the debate surrounding the strict liability penalty, strict liability should not be adopted. hand, the strict liability standard is not demonstrably connected to superior deterrence of tax shelters, while on the other hand it carries the risk of producing profound unfairness to the taxpayer. 325 Furthermore, strict liability carries potential unintended consequences, which may span beyond increased litigation between IRS and the taxpayer or lead to disuse of the ESD itself. 326 Without a full understanding of the consequences of adopting the strict liability standard, it would be premature at best to enact it under the ESD codification proposal. A comprehensive assessment of workable alternatives must be considered before the strict liability penalty standard can be justifiably adopted, if at all.
B. The Reasonable Cause Exception Should Remain a Feature of the Penalty Regime
Having resolved that the strict liability standard should not be adopted, this section suggests two possible alternatives. One is to retain the current penalty regime, which can be viewed as sufficiently addressing the tax shelter problem. 327 The other is to develop an alternative solution altogether that does not rely on a pure strict liability standard. In either of these two scenarios, the reasonable cause exception should be a feature of the penalty regime to avoid the pitfalls of the strict liability standard.
Should the current penalty regime be retained, understatement penalties will continue to be assessed for noneconomic substance transactions, but the reasonable cause exception will remain available. 328 This preserves the taxpayer's interests in asserting the reasonable cause defense while also preserving IRS's interest, as courts can declare that reasonable cause is lacking in a given case and uphold the penalty. 329 While proponents of strict liability may characterize the status quo as failing to increase the stakes in the tax shelter battle, the counterargument is that the current penalty regime appears to be working, as IRS continues to win its cases in the courts under existing laws. 330 Thus, the current penalty regime does not appear to be in urgent need of a deviation to the strict liability standard. Moreover, the argument can be made that the current penalty regime should be preferred over the codified version because one of the merits of the ESD is its flexibility to identify and invalidate varying forms of tax shelter transactions, which cannot be as aptly accomplished with one statutory definition of economic substance. 331 Should an alternative solution be developed, it must avoid the pitfalls of a pure strict liability standard. One alternative that deserves support is the approach suggested by Lawrence Hill provides for two levels of penalties, with the level of penalty turning on disclosure. 332 If the taxpayer adequately discloses the transaction at issue, the penalty would be twenty percent, and the taxpayer would have the opportunity to assert the reasonable cause exception. 333 Judicial review would be available for the penalty that was assessed. 334 If the taxpayer does not adequately disclose the transaction, then a higher forty percent penalty would apply on a strict liability basis, but the IRS Commissioner would have discretion to rescind the penalty according to published criteria. 335 The Commissioner's refusal to rescind the penalty would be reviewable by a court for abuse of discretion. 336 As Hill and Minkovich point out, this approach reaches a compromise by effectuating more serious consequences for noneconomic substance transactions while retaining the reasonable cause exception, hence avoiding at least some of the problems with due process or voluntary disclosure. 337 This approach, or others like it, would comport with the views of those who advocate a higher penalty to deter tax shelters but still oppose codification for its shortcomings. 338 Whatever the solution, it cannot come at the expense of fairness to the taxpayer, and IRS may need to conduct a comprehensive assessment of its penalty administration before a suitable solution can be developed. 339 
CONCLUSION
It is undoubtedly important to curb abusive tax shelters and noneconomic substance transactions. In pursuing this goal, the competing interests of deterrence on one side and fairness to the taxpayer on the other must be carefully balanced. The proposed strict liability standard for penalizing noneconomic substance transactions represents a significant change from the reasonable cause exception used in existing tax law. Notwithstanding the merits of the arguments on each side of the debate, arguments weigh Taxation) ; Jackel, supra note 50, at 76; VanderWolk, supra note 64, at 547; Ventry, supra note 173, at 1411; Wolfman, supra note 322, at 445. In analyzing individual income tax understatement penalties, Professor William A. Drennan advocates an alternative solution that features varying levels of penalty based on the taxpayer's level of disclosure. He first argues that tax avoidance cannot adequately be addressed by either a fault-based system that permits exceptions or a purely strict liability system that undermines compliance. Rather, he suggests an alternative solution in which a taxpayer making full and conspicuous disclosure is excused from the penalty or assessed graduated penalty rates for small mistakes. See Drennan, supra note 223.
339. The U.S. Government Accountability Office, in its 2008 report to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, pointed out that IRS is not meeting its expectation of conducting continuous and comprehensive assessment of its penalty administration to ensure effective and fair penalties that encourage voluntary compliance. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 233, at 18.
